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Party Splits in Turkish Party System:
The Case of Centre-Right Parties
ÖZHAN DEMIRKOL
Department of Political Sciences, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
ABSTRACT This study offers the first systematic analysis of party splits in Turkish electoral
politics. It first explores party splits from major parties since the late 1940s before focusing on
splits from three Turkish centre-right parties in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1990s. This article finds
no detectable patterns between the entry costs measured by disproportionality, and the occur-
rence of party splits in Turkey. Instead, it argues that perceived demand for new parties and
internal party dynamics, namely changes in party ideology and leadership consolidation, push
the dissident factions out of the party and have a decisive influence over their decision to estab-
lish a new party. The article concludes with a note on the implications of this finding for con-
temporary Turkish party politics.
Introduction
In mid-December 2013, a corruption investigation ensnared several businessmen
close to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish Prime Minister and the chair of the
Justice and Development Party (AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi).1 Erdoğan
stated that the followers of an influential Muslim preacher, Fethullah Gülen, had
been engaged in a conspiracy against him.2 When the government then introduced
several laws to curb the power of the followers of Gülen in the bureaucracy and
purged a number of police officers, nine AKP deputies resigned. There was specu-
lation that these deputies intended to form a new party, but that has not happened yet.3
Such party switching and formation of new parties by dissident deputies is nothing
new for Turkey. In fact, the AKP itself is 1 of 17 splinter parties that have had par-
liamentary representation since 1946 (Table 1). While there has been scholarly inter-
est in the successful splinter parties, most of those parties that did not turn into
significant competitors have not attracted much attention. Although they occur less
in Western democracies, party splits are common in second and third wave democ-
racies.4 However, comparative studies specifically focusing on party splits are few,
although several studies provide in-depth analysis of individual cases of party
splits.5 Studies on new party formation analyze the exogenous factors that influence
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Republican People’s Party CHP Democrat Party DP 1946 – 61
Democrat Party DP Nation Party (1) MP (1) 1948 4.6 1
Democrat Party DP Peasants’ Party of Turkey TKP 1952 0.6 0
Democrat Party DP Freedom Party HP 1955 3.5 4
Republican Peasants’ and
Nation Party
CKMP Nation Party (2) MP (2) 1962 6.3 31
Republican People’s Party CHP Reliance Party GP 1967 6.6 15
Justice Party AP Democratic Party DkP 1970 11.9 45
Republican People’s Party CHP Republican Party CP 1972 Merged with the GP 15
Social Democratic Populist Party SHP People’s Labor Party HEP 1990 Electoral Coalition
with the SHP
18
Social Democratic Populist Party SHP Socialist Unity Party SBP 1991 Did not participate
in elections
Motherland Party ANAP New Party YP 1993 0.1 0
Nationalist Action Party MHP Great Union Party BBP 1993 Electoral Coalition
with the ANAP
8
True Path Party DYP Democrat Turkey Party DTP 1997 0.6 0
Democratic Left Party DSP Changing Turkey’s Party DEPAR 1998 0.1 0
Virtue Party FP Justice and Development Party AKP 2001 34.3 363
Democratic Left Party DSP New Turkey Party YTP 2002 1.2 0
Justice and Development Party AKP Turkey Party TP 2009 Did not participate
in elections
Notes: Numbers in parentheses distinguish parties with the same names. Only splinter parties with parliamentary representation are included.
Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al., Cumhuriyet Dönemi Siyasi Partileri, 1923–2006; Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM Albümü,1920–




































the calculations of the founders of both genuinely new and splinter parties, while
works on party switching analyze the factors that influence the strategic calculations
of deputies changing their party allegiance.6 Finally, studies on the institutional and
social determinants of party system fragmentation deal with the indirect impacts of
these factors on party splits.7 However, except for studies on the individual cases
of party splits, others have neglected the intra-party dimension of politics.
This article therefore has two objectives. Firstly, it seeks to determine extent to
which party splits in Turkey can be explained by the same factors that previous
research on new party formation has revealed. Secondly, it attempts to explore the
intra-party factors that play a role in party splits within the Turkish centre-right.
The article starts by discussing the influence of electoral characteristics, namely dis-
proportionality, turnout, and volatility, on party splits in Turkey. This is followed by
an in-depth study, drawing on party bylaws and histories, biographies and newspaper
articles, of three splits that have occurred in Turkey’s centre-right, concerning the
Democrat Party (DP, Demokrat Parti), the Justice Party (AP, Adalet Partisi), and
the True Path Party (DYP, Doğru Yol Partisi). This study concludes that changes
in party ideology and leadership consolidation pushed the dissenting factions out
of the centre-right parties whereas the belief in the demand for a new party had a deci-
sive influence over their decisions to establish a new party.
Exogenous Factors in Party Splits
Studies on new party formation and party system fragmentation have noted two main
factors that dissidents of an established party take into account before leaving the
parent organization: the presence of a neglected demand (i.e. the problem push) and
the institutional facilitators of new party entrance (i.e. the opportunity pull).8 Although
the studies that deal with party splits have proposed institutional factors like the degree
of centralization or executive–legislative relations as explanatory variables, this work
ignores them since they did not vary over time in Turkey. Besides, since the splinter
parties with parliamentary representation were exempted from the costs to appear on
the ballot, the analysis of these costs is excluded. Hence, this article focuses on the
impacts of the electoral system on party splits in Turkey.
Disproportionality
Disproportionality is a measure of the aggregate gap between the proportion of votes
obtained and the proportion of seats received by each party.9 Studies on new party
formation and party system fragmentation agree that the electoral systems that
convert votes to seats disproportionately result in fewer number of effective
parties.10 The electoral systems that increase the number of votes needed to be
won in order to gain seats in parliament tend to deter new comers.11 However, the
Turkish case invalidates this expectation.
The second, the third, and the fourth column of Table 2, which shows the associ-
ation between disproportionality and effective number of parliamentary parties,



































of splinter parties Disproportionality
Effective number of
parliamentary parties Turnout rate Volatility
1950 1 MP (1) 28.12 1.33 89.30 –
1954 1 TKP (1) 32.23 1.15 86.60 4.5
1957 1 HP 17.73 1.76 76.60 7.2
1961 0 – 2.04 3.26 81.40 4.8
1965 1 MP (2) 2.34 2.62 71.30 23.5
1969 1 GP 8.98 2.35 64.30 11.25
1973 1 DkP 6.84 3.32 66.80 14.4
1977 0 – 6.59 2.47 72.40 18.0
1983 0 – 6.84 2.53 92.30 –
1987 0 – 22.30 2.05 93.30 38.5
1991 1 SBP 11.34 3.58 83.30 16.6
1995 2 YP; BBP 9.78 4.40 85.20 17.9
1999 2 DTP; DEPAR 9.45 4.87 87.10 20.2
2002 2 AKP; YTP 27.04 1.85 79.10 41.7
2007 0 – 11.91 2.26 84.25 18.6
2011 0 – 7.40 2.36 83.16 11.6
Notes: Disproportionality is calculated according to the Gallagher Index and includes all parties and independents participating in the elections.
Effective number of parliamentary parties weights parties by seats won. Volatility for pre-1980 period is calculated according to the Pedersen
formula. Detailed formulas are provided in the Appendix. Volatility for the post-1980 period is derived from Tezcür, “Trends and





































demonstrates that disproportionality has not deterred dissident factions from forming
their own parties in Turkey. For instance, despite the high level of disproportionality
due to winner-take-all elections in the 1950s, dissident members of the DP founded
their own parties. Similarly, although the ten percent national electoral threshold
devised by the military after the 1980 intervention increased the votes needed to
win parliamentary seats, party splits were frequent in the 1990s. Although the pro-
portional electoral system of the 1960s decreased disproportionality, it did not encou-
rage party splits after the 1973 elections. In this sense, except for the period between
1961 and 1973, disproportionality was far from constituting a barrier for the entrance
of splinter parties.
Electoral Viability of New Parties
Dissident factions can be encouraged to split from their established parties by the per-
ceived demand for a new party. That is, political entrepreneurs are likely to invest
their resources in a new party when they believe that their party will attract sufficient
support.12 This belief might stem from a transformation of the cleavage structure that
leads to the rise of a new voter base with new concerns.13 If the established parties are
reluctant to meet these new demands, the dissident faction may assume that a new
splinter party could attract the support of this dissatisfied vote base.14 Alternatively,
the poor economic performance of the incumbent parties may encourage voters to
cast their vote for “untried” parties. Consequently, dissident party members may cal-
culate that they can win the support of dissatisfied voters if they invest in a new
party.15
Intra-variation studies on new party formation suggest three ways to assess the
probability of electoral support for a potential splinter party. Firstly, party dissidents
may use pre-election polls to estimate support for their new party. If the polls show
voter discontent with the established parties or support for a new party, then the dis-
sidents may defect from their established party. In Turkey, for example, during the
second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s, pre-election polls indicated that there
was a significant number of undecided and protest votes and support for the potential
new parties.16 While this may have helped trigger the departure of dissidents from
their parties, there were no pre-election polls until the 1977 elections, so the political
entrepreneurs of the pre-1980 period had to rely on other indicators of electoral
viability.17
A second way to assess the potential support for a new party is turnout rates. Dis-
sident factions may consider the decreasing turnout rates in previous elections as sig-
naling voter discontent with the established parties and calculate that a new party can
receive significant support, leading to an increase in splinter parties.18 Analysis of
Turkish elections supports this expectation for the pre-1980 period. Turnout rates
decreased to 38.30 percent in the 1955 municipal elections, which was boycotted
by the opposition parties, just before the governing DP split.19 The second and
fifth columns of Table 2 demonstrate the association between decreasing turnout
rates and party splits in the 1960s, whereas splits decreased once turnout rates rise






























with the 1973 elections. However, after the introduction of the compulsory voting in
1983, the association between turnout rates and party splits disappears, making
turnout rate no longer a valid indicator for estimating support for a potential splinter
party for the post-1980 period.
The third indicator of the level of party system institutionalization is the level of
electoral volatility.20 Un-institutionalized party systems, characterized by low popu-
larity of established parties, weak grounding of parties in civil society and weak par-
tisan identities, encourage party splits since the dissident factions may consider that
their new parties can win the support of floating voter base.21 Consequently, party
splits may increase if the electoral volatility is high.
As the second and the seventh columns of Table 2 demonstrate, party splits in
Turkey were associated with the high levels of volatility in both the 1960s and the
1990s. However, the splits in the DP despite the lower volatility in the 1950s and
the absence of party splits after the 1973 elections despite the increasing volatility
need to be explained. Moreover, the association between volatility and party splits
is problematic due to the reciprocal relationship between these two variables. That
is, volatility may result from voters’ support for the newly formed parties, or it
may cause dissident political entrepreneurs to believe that they can win the votes
of free-floating voters by investing in a new party.22 Therefore, given that the dispro-
portionality did not constitute a barrier for party splits and that the indicators of the
electoral viability used in the literature were not sufficient for explaining party
splits in Turkey, a closer look at the internal dynamics of political parties may
provide clues for explaining the phenomenon.
Party Splits in the Turkish Centre-Right
Until 2002, all three centre-right parties shared the so-called “1946 Spirit,” which
indicated opposition to single-party authoritarianism. The DP was the governing
party from 1950 until the military intervention in 1960. The AP became the main suc-
cessor of the DP and ruled the country from 1965 to 1971. After all existing parties
were banned following the military intervention of 1980, the DYP was founded to
succeed the AP. The following section analyses three cases of party splits in the
Turkish centre-right and discusses the importance of exogenous and intra-party
factors for explaining them. However, before this, a brief history of intra-party con-
flicts in Turkey is required (Table 3).
The first split analyzed in this study occurred in the DP in 1955. The split was a
result of the demands of 19 DP deputies for the removal of the authoritarian legacies
of the single-party period, which had been promised by the DP. Specifically, the dis-
sident DP deputies, who became known as the “advocators of the right to proof”
(İspatçılar) demanded that journalists who had been taken to court should have the
right to defend what they had written.23 However, the DP’s leader Adnan Menderes
expelled the leaders of the dissenting faction before the party’s fourth general con-
gress in October 1955.24 The expelled dissidents had expected that between 100































deputies chose to struggle within the party, using a vote of confidence to bring down
the DP government in November 1955.26 Afterwards, Menderes promised to demo-
cratize the regime.27 Despite Menderes’s apparent retreat, the expelled deputies did
not believe in his sincerity and formed the Freedom Party (HP, Hürriyet Partisi) in
late 1955.28
The second split occurred in the ruling AP in 1970. Since its foundation, the AP
had been factionalized into three groups, namely the moderates (Mutediller), the con-
servative hardliners (Müfritler), and the radical nationalists, who were united around
the common goal of “bringing justice to the imprisoned DP leaders” but disagreed
over the strategies to be employed against the military.29 Following the death of
party’s first chair Ragıp Gümüşpala, Süleyman Demirel was selected as the new
AP chair. Demirel initially opted to balance the conservatives known as the “adher-
ents of Saadettin Bilgiç” (Bilgiççiler) and the moderates, called the “sworns”

















The DP chair abandoned
intra-party democracy
and broke his promise
to democratize the
regime
The AP leader turned
the party from a party











































Note: Names of dissenting factions are ascribed by the journalists.






























(Yeminliler). However, following the 1969 elections, Demirel abandoned his conci-
liatory stance by expelling some of the Bilgiççiler from the party.30 With the support
of the now-released DP leaders, who were disappointed with Demirel’s reluctance to
restore their political rights, the Bilgiççiler revolted, accused Demirel of abandoning
intra-party democracy and turning the party into a machine for satisfying his personal
interests.31 Some of the dissidents then cooperated with the main opposition party,
to formally accuse Demirel of misconduct.32 Finally, the Bilgiççiler caused the
second Demirel government to fall by voting against it.33 Nevertheless, Demirel
did not retreat, instead expelling 26 deputies before the fifth general congress.
Once Demirel won the fifth general congress, the expelled dissidents founded
the Democratic Party (DkP, Demokratik Parti) as the “true successor” of the
outlawed DP.
The AP’s successor after the 1980 intervention was the DYP. After Demirel
became President of the Turkish Republic in 1993, Tansu Çiller, a professor of econ-
omics, who had no relations with the DP’s tradition, was selected as the new party
chair. Çiller gradually consolidated her control over the extra-parliamentary party
by removing some of Demirel’s close associates and co-opting others.34 Çiller’s
attempt to form a minority government prior to the 1995 elections led to reaction
by several deputies headed by Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the former Speaker of the
Turkish Grand National Assembly and a potential challenger for Çiller’s position.
The minority government was unable to win vote of confidence, with 13 DYP depu-
ties, who were later expelled from the party, voting against it or abstaining.35 Follow-
ing the 1995 elections, the DYP’s decision to form a coalition with the pro-Islamist
Welfare Party (RP, Refah Partisi) provoked further discontent that ended with the res-
ignation of Çiller’s remaining opponents, known as the “supporters of new for-
mation” (Yeni Oluşumcular).36 These dissidents initially expected that they would
be accompanied by a significant number of deputies, not only from the DYP but
also the Motherland Party (ANAP, Anavatan Partisi), the mainstream centre-right
party that ruled the country between 1983 and 1991.37 However, once their expec-
tations failed to come true, they formed the Democrat Turkey Party (DTP, Demokrat
Türkiye Partisi) in January 1997.
As previously noted, dissidents from both the DP and the DYP left their parent
organization even though the electoral systems had a disproportional vote to seat con-
version. The level of disproportionality prior to the split in the DP was 32.23 per cent,
while, although the disproportionality level prior to the split in the DYP was 9.78
percent, the ten percent national threshold had increased the votes needed to win par-
liamentary seats. Thus, both cases contradict the expectation that higher dispropor-
tionality should deter the deputies, who are mainly motivated by the re-election
goal. However, while re-election goal is an important goal for politicians, they
may also seek to realize certain other policy goals. Hence, as some studies have
already found, such politicians may decide to invest their resources in a new party
in order to articulate certain policies even under electoral systems producing dispro-
portional conversion of votes to seats.38 One might then ask why the DP and the DYP































their parties. The answer to this question is closely related with the potential support
for a new party.
The analysis in the first part of the article, which reveals the limitations with the
three indicators used to assess the viability of new parties, should not lead to conclude
that they are irrelevant. On the contrary, these indicators seem to have led the dissi-
dent factions in Turkish centre-right parties to conclude that their new parties could
receive electoral support. For example, turnout rates that decreased from 86.60
percent in 1954 general elections to 38.30 percent in 1955 municipal elections and
from 71.30 percent in 1965 general elections to 64.30 percent in 1969 general elec-
tions may have been interpreted by DP and AP dissidents respectively that a new
party could attract sufficient electoral support. On the other hand, increasing levels
of volatility in the 1990s seems to have led DYP dissidents to conclude that a new
centre-right party uniting the fragmented centre-right could attract electoral
support. In fact, the dissidents expected that such a party would receive around 25
percent of the votes.39 However, although perceived demand for a new party
seems to lead the dissidents to establish new parties, what pushed them from the
established parties remains a question to be answered. Since party splits lie on the
borders of intra-party and inter-party relations, a detailed analysis of intra-party
factors may reveal the reasons behind party splits on Turkish centre-right.40 There-
fore, the analysis of the source of disagreement and power distribution among com-
peting factions is required.
Perceived Party Change
In all three cases of party splits described above, the members of the dissenting fac-
tions believed that their party had deviated from its founding principles under the lea-
dership of the current chair. The İspatçılar of the DP argued that the party had been
originally formed to enhance freedom and democracy but that it had failed to demo-
cratize the regime under Menderes’s leadership.41 They argued that the party was no
longer the same as it was when in opposition so a new party was required to revitalize
its founding “anti-authoritarian spirit.”42
The dissidents of the AP and the DYP also claimed to represent the so-called “1946
spirit.” For the Bilgiççiler, the AP chair had betrayed the party’s ideals to obtain per-
sonal gain.43 The “unlawful and undemocratic expulsion of the true democrats” fol-
lowing the 1969 elections and the support of the party chair for the Yeminliler were
taken as evidence of the party chair’s attempt to establish one-man rule over the
party.44 Hence, they claimed, the party was changing from a party of ideals to a
party of personal interests.45
The same line of argument was voiced by the Yeni Oluşumcular of the DYP, who
opposed Çiller’s attempt to create a new, urban, modern, and youthful image for the
party by excluding the party’s “real owners, who had dedicated their lives to the
realization of the 1946 spirit.”46 For the Yeni Oluşumcular, Çiller’s attempts to
replace the veterans of the Democrat tradition with her followers, and her decision
to form a governing coalition with the Islamist RP, was evidence that she wished






























to turn the party from a party of mission into a personal machine.47 Corruption alle-
gations against the party leaders in all cases further reinforced the perception of the
dissidents about the party change.48 This perception led the dissident factions to con-
clude that a “purifier party” was required to revitalize the founding principles of the
established parties.49
The perceived party change may have led the dissenting factions to feel unable to
voice their dissent within the party.50 Nevertheless, perceived party change is not a
sufficient condition for party splits on its own because the dissident faction may
attempt to prevent unwanted party change if it has enough power. Hence, power dis-
tribution between the competing factions is also crucial for explaining the variation in
the responses of the party leaders toward competing demands. Although the obser-
vers of Turkish politics relate party splits to the tendency of party chairs to expel
their opponents, there are instances that the leaders refrained from exclusionary
measures.51 For example, the AP’s first chair opted for a compromise between the
factions during the party’s formative years.52 In a similar vein, Demirel accommo-
dated the demands of the dissenting faction until the 1969 elections.53 Similarly,
although DP leader Menderes expelled dissident deputies in October 1955, he prom-
ised to meet their demands only one month after their expulsions.54 Finally, DYP
leader Çiller co-opted some of her opponents prior to the 1995 elections while ignor-
ing their demands after the elections.55 The reason behind these strategies is closely
related to the distribution of factional power within party organization.
Weakness of the Dissenting Factions Within the Ruling Party Face
Political parties have three faces: party on the ground, party in public office, and the
party in central office.56 The party face, which is primarily responsible for the nomi-
nation of deputies and party officers, disciplining party members and determining
party policies and strategies, has the upper hand in controlling the party organiz-
ation.57 The weakness of a dissident faction within the ruling party face makes it
easy for the party leader to ignore their demands, even in times of a serious intra-
party conflict. Therefore, a closer look at the organizational characteristics of the
established parties may explain party splits.
All three parties discussed here adopted a decentralized party model in which the
extra-parliamentary party held the upper hand in deciding on party policies and strat-
egies, disciplining dissident deputies, and nominating candidates. Accordingly, the
general congresses were the highest decision-making organs, setting policies and
strategies.58 The General Administrative Councils (GACs), whose members were
selected at the general congresses, were responsible for implementing the congresses’
decisions and for administering party organization.59 Although the parliamentary
groups were granted some limited autonomy, deputies were nevertheless obliged to
act in line with the parties’ basic principles and programs and the binding decisions
taken by the parliamentary groups.60 Moreover, the deputies were subject to disci-
plinary action if they violated the decisions of the central office or the principle of































parties in all cases were responsible for nominating candidates. The DP and the AP
by-laws stipulated that the candidates would be chosen by primary elections, whereas
the DYP by-law authorized the GAC to determine the nomination methods.62
However, the GACs of the AP and the DYP could veto those registering for nomina-
tions.63 Given that the GACs of all parties had the right to dismiss local executive
boards, the faction that held the majority in the GAC had the power to influence, if
not to determine, the nominations.64 Consequently, the outcome of the intra-party
factional competition depended on the distribution of seats among the factions on
the GACs.
The third row in Table 4 shows that the dissenting factions remained a minority in
each party’s central office before the party split. The İspatçılar had two seats in the
DP’s GAC, which was composed of 15 seats; the Bilgiççiler held 8 out of 27 seats in
the AP’s GAC, while the dissidents of the DYP won 12 out of 40 seats of the GAC at
the 1993 congress. Given their minority position, the dissidents were unable to
change their party leadership from within the party. Additionally, they were a min-
ority in each parliamentary party, with the total number of deputies switching to
the splinter parties for the DP, AP, and DYP being 36, 37, and 23 out of 503, 256,
and 135 seats, respectively. Since they remained in minority in both the GAC and
the parliamentary parties, the dissidents could not use these platforms to reverse
the process of party change.
Sources of Party Leaders’ Legitimacy: Party Leader Selection Methods and
Electoral Performance
Although in all three cases conflict over party change and the weakness of the dissent-
ing factions laid the ground for their expulsion, one might wonder why the party lea-
dership refused to accommodate the minority faction’s demands, even if doing so led
to a party split. The answer to this question may be related with the issue of the legiti-
macy of the party leadership. A century ago, Michels stated that party leaders con-
sidered themselves as representing the party’s collective will, therefore, demanding
Table 4. Seats Held by the Dissident Members in the Parliamentary and Extra-parliamentary
Parties
DP AP DYP
Year of last general congress prior to the intra-party conflict 1951 1968 1993
Ratio of dissident members to the total number of seats in the Central
Executive Board (in percent)
13.33 29.63 30.00
Percentage of seats held by the party in the parliament 92.98 56.89 24.55
Ratio of dissident deputies to the total number of party deputies (in
percent)
7.16 14.45 17.04
Notes: Dissident members are the executive board members, who switched to splinter parties.
Dissident deputies are the deputies, who switched to splinter parties.






























obedience and submission to their personal will by pointing out the democratic nature
of their election.65 Two factors reinforce this tendency: party leader selection
methods and the previous electoral performances of the established parties.
In all three cases, the party leaders were elected at the general congresses that were
composed of both ex officio members and delegates selected at provincial con-
gresses.66 The third row of Table 5 demonstrates that party chairs received the
support of nearly all delegates at their general congresses prior to the splits, while
the fifth row shows that they confirmed their leadership after the splits. Hence, in
response to the dissident members’ criticisms about the lack of intra-party democ-
racy, the party leaders pointed out to the will of the general congress.67 For
example, the AP’s leader argued that the dissidents’ claims about the lack of
intra-party democracy were null and void since the party administration was demo-
cratically elected.68 Similarly, the DP’s leader stated that the party organs were demo-
cratically selected, reminding the dissenting members that they had previously agreed
to the measures that they were now criticizing.69
In addition to the congress results, previous electoral results increased the legiti-
macy of the party leadership. The DP increased its votes from 55.2 percent in
1950 to 58.4 percent in the 1954 elections. Although the AP’s votes fell from 52.9
percent in 1965 to 46.6 percent in the 1969 elections, the party continued to hold a
majority of the seats in the lower house. Both parties’ leaders interpreted these elec-
toral victories as confirmation of their leadership by the voters. For example, follow-
ing the 1954 elections, the DP chair stated that he did not need to consult liberal
journalists since the voters had supported his policies, while one of the Bilgiççiler cri-
ticized Demirel for interpreting the results of the 1969 elections as his personal
success.70 Finally, although the DYP’s votes decreased from 27 percent in 1991 to
19.2 percent in 1995, the party’s electoral performance was far nevertheless better
than the dissidents had expected, who had viewed the elections as a litmus test for
Çiller’s chair.71 The DYP leader’s unanticipated victory gave legitimacy to her con-
tinued rule. Consequently, the party leaders, who considered themselves as represen-
tatives of the party’s collective will demanded obedience to their rule.
Table 5. General Congress and Electoral Results
DP AP DYP
Year of last general congress prior to the split 1951 1968 1993
Votes for the party chair in the last general congress (in percent) 94.95 100.00 86.01
Year of the first congress after the resignations/expulsions 1955 1970 1996
Votes received by the party chair at the first congress
after the resignations/expulsions (in percent)
97.66 94.68 90.65
Votes for the party in the last elections prior to
the split (in percent)
58.40 46.60 19.20
































Scholarly works on party system fragmentation and new party formation have
revealed the importance of exogenous factors, such as the electoral system and trans-
formation of social cleavages for explaining party splits. The analysis of the Turkish
case shows that disproportionality does not necessarily prevent party splits. This
study’s detailed analysis of three splits in Turkish centre-right parties reveals that
changes in party ideology and leadership consolidation pushed the dissenting factions
out of the centre-right parties whereas the belief in the demand for a new party that
would revitalize the established parties’ founding principles had a decisive influence
over their decisions to establish a new party. Hence, the analysis shows that we
should not underestimate the role of intra-party dynamics and factors in party
splits. Rather, paying equal importance to both endogenous and exogenous factors
and dynamics may substantially improve our understanding of party splits.
Although the findings are limited to three cases of party splits in Turkey, they
imply that factional tendencies can survive under electoral systems that increase
the votes required to win parliamentary seats. However, this outcome depends on
the perceived viability of a new party, the source of factional conflicts that motivate
the splinter party’s political project, and the power distribution among the competing
factions. In Turkey, since the 2002 elections, decreasing electoral volatility and
increasing turnout rates, which indicate that the party system has stabilized, may
have been impeding factions from forming splinter parties. Regarding the recent
developments in the AKP, the weakness of the dissident members in the party organ-
ization and the legitimacy of the AKP leader, whose leadership has been reconfirmed
by each election and general congress, seem to push the deputies that resigned out of
the party. However, the AKP’s victory in the municipal elections of March 30, 2014,
despite corruption allegations may have indicated to them that a new party might be
unable to attract sufficient voter support. This implies that dissident AKP deputies
will be less likely to invest in a new party in the near future.
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3. “Ertuğrul Günay İstifa Eden Vekillerle Yeni Parti Kuruyor.” Bugün, March 25, 2014.
4. See Cotta, “Structuring the New Party Systems”; Harmel and Robertson, “Formation and Success of
New Parties”; and Hug, Altering Party Systems.






























5. See Charney, “Class Conflict and the National Party Split”; Cole, “Factionalism, the French Socialist
Party and the Fifth Republic”; Katrak, “India’s Communist Party Split”; and Nuvunga and Adalima,
Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM).
6. See Desposato, “Parties for Rent?”; Desposato and Scheiner, “Governmental Centralization and Party
Affiliation”; and Heller and Mershon, “Switching in Parliamentary Parties”.
7. See Bochsler, “The ‘Normalization’ of Party Systems” and Olson, “Party Formation and Party System
Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe”. For studies on party system fragmentation
in Turkey, see Sayarı, “The Turkish Party System in Transition”; Özbudun and Tachau, “Social
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55. Cizre, “From Ruler to Pariah,” 95.
56. Katz and Mair, “The Ascendancy of Party in Public Office,” 121–6.
57. Gibson and Harmel. “Party Families and Democratic Performance,” 216–7.
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65. Michels, Political Parties, 135.
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Özhan Demirkol is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Bilkent University, Ankara. He has a BS degree
in Political Science and Public Administration from Bilkent University. He was awarded a master’s degree
from the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University. His research areas include Turkish
political history and party politics.
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Krouwel, André, and Onno Bosch. “Explaining the Emergence of New Parties: Cynical Citizens and the
Rise of Populism.” Paper prepared for Politicologenetmaal, Antwerpen, 27–28, 2004.
Lago, Ignacio, and Ferran Martinez. “Why New Parties?” Party Politics 17, no. 1 (2011): 3–20.
Lucardie, Paul. “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors: Towards a Theory on the Emergence of New Parties.”
Party Politics 6, no. 2 (2000): 175–185.
Mainwaring, Scott. “Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective.”
Comparative Politics 24, no. 1 (1991): 21–43.
Michels, Robert. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern
Democracy. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.
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Appendix
The effective number of parliamentary parties is calculated by first taking the seat share of each party as a
decimal, squaring this value, and summing these values for all parties. Independents are ignored. The figure
obtained is then inverted.
Volatility for the pre-1980 period is calculated according to the Pedersen formula, bearing in mind the
points raised by Güneş Murat Tezcür (2012). Actual formulas are
1954 − 1950 =
∑
(|DP54 + TKP54 − DP50||CHP54 − CHP50||CMP54
− MP50||IP54 − 0||Independents54 − Independents50|)/2,
1957 − 1954 =
∑
(|DP57 + HP57 − DP54||CHP57 − CHP54||CMP57
− CMP54||VP1957 − 0||Independents57 − Independents54|)/2,
1961 − 1957 =
∑
(|CHP61 − CHP57 + HP57||AP61 + YTP61
− DP57||CKMP61 − CMP57||Independents61
− Independents57|)/2,
1965 − 1961 =
∑
(|CHP65 − CHP61||AP65 − AP61||YTP65
− YTP61||CKMP65 + MP65 − CKMP61||TIP65
− 0||Independents65 − Independents61|)/2,
1969 − 1965 =
∑
(|CHP69 + GP69 − CHP65||AP69 − AP65||MHP69
− CKMP65||YTP69 − YTP65||TIP69 − TIP65||MP69
− MP65||BP69 − 0||Independents69 − Independents65|)/2,
1973 − 1969 =
∑
(|CHP73 + CGP73 − CHP69 − GP69||AP73 + DkP73
− AP69||MHP73 − MHP69||MSP73 − 0||MP73 − MP69||TBP73
− BP69||Independents73 − Independents69|)/2,
1977 − 1969 =
∑
(|CHP77 − CHP73||AP77 − AP73||DkP77 − Dkp73||MSP77
− MSP73||MHP77 − MHP73||TBP77 − TBP73||CGP77
− CGP73||TIP77 − 0||Independents77 − Independents73|)/2.
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